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Abstract 
In the context of ongoing criticisms of the lack of pluralism in economics, the 
present article aims to discuss the development of  ‘heterodox’ economics since 
the 1970s. Following Lakatos’s concept of scientific research programs (srp), and 
concentrating on the situation in Germany, the article will discuss classifications 
of economics, and will specify the understanding of diversity in the light of ‘axi-
omatic variations’ of the economic mainstream. This will form the basis for the 
subsequent description of the development of heterodoxy in Germany, with spe-
cial reference to the founding of new universities and the reform movements in 
the 1970s. It can be shown that the heterodox scene flourished in this period, 
but that this pluralization remained fragmented and short-lived; by the 1980s at 
the latest heterodoxy was again on its way to marginalization. The history of het-
erodoxy in Germany thus presents itself as an unequal ‘battle of the paradigms,’ 
and can only be told as the story of a failure. 
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The short rise and long fall of heterodox economics in 
Germany after the 1970s. Explorations in a scientific field of 
power and struggle 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1992 a group of economists published a ‘Plea for a Pluralistic and Rigorous 
Economics’ in the American Economic Review which was also signed by several 
Nobel laureates (including Franco Mogdiliani, Paul Samuelson and Jan Tinber-
gen).  Although the ‘mainstream’ criticized in this plea as an intellectual monopo-
ly is not explicitly named, there is no doubt that the authors were alluding to the 
‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model’ (DSGE), usually referred to as 
‘neoclassical economics’ (cf. Düppe/Weintraub 2014: XII). This model not only 
provided the foundation for the vast majority of all research articles, but also 
constituted the canon in the widely used textbooks of (mainly) American authors 
(e.g. Mankiw’s Introduction to Economics and Samuelson/Nordhaus’s Econom-
ics).  
 
There are two interesting things about this ‘plea.’ Firstly, it asserts the domi-
nance of a scientific paradigm in economics (‘intellectual monopoly’), though this 
is occasionally challenged with regard to numerous ‘axiomatic variations.’1 Sec-
ondly, it deplores this dominance, an attitude which is also not universally 
shared. Olivier Blanchard (2008), for example, quite recently described the state 
of economics as ‘good,’ primarily because a consensus model had been success-
fully established within the DSGE paradigm. This seemed not only to settle the 
long-lasting quarrel between the ‘Keynesians’ and the ‘neoclassical economists,’ 
but also provided the basis for an economic policy allowing a historically unprec-
edented stability of growth (‘Great Moderation’; cf. Summers 2005). In the terms 
of the much-quoted philosopher of science Thomas Samuel Kuhn, a ‘normal sci-
ence’ had developed, and economics had thus attained the status of a ‘mature’ 
science. According to this understanding, pluralism is a sign of immaturity or of a 
revolutionary paradigm shift within a science, while monism is a mark of maturi-
ty and ‘normality’ in the business of science. 
 
Since the last global financial crisis, everything has changed. The self-assurance 
of mainstream economics has gone: within the discipline, there are calls for 
changes,2 while external critics ask why the crisis was not predicted, and why 
there are no ready-made recipes for dealing with crises on the scale of the latest 
                                                           
1
 Cf. especially Colander (2000) and Colander/Holt/Rosser (2004). 
2
 Cf. amongst others Blanchard/Del’Arricia/Mauro (2010), Caballero (2010), Galbraith (2013), 
Stiglitz (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2014).  
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global financial crisis and the resulting European debt crisis.3 Critics are calling 
into question the universal validity of a paradigm that is ontologically defined by 
an optimistic faith in self-regulation, and is almost completely fixated on 
allocative questions, instead of calling into question the conditions and risks of 
stability (cf. Lucas 2003: 11).  
 
The aim here is not to argue for the pluralization of economics on the basis of 
the theory and philosophy of science;4 the plea for pluralization in 1992, just like 
numerous other memoranda and appeals published by academics and students 
since then,5 is sufficient indication of the lack of plurality and the continued ex-
istence of a monistic consensus in the community of economists. Instead, the 
central question will be why the state of pluralization that was apparent in sur-
veys of economists at the beginning of the 1980s (cf. Frey/Humbert/Schneider 
2007), was not maintained or indeed expanded when many faculties of econom-
ics were effectively re-founded at the East German universities after German 
reunification in the 1990s.6 To do this, we need to briefly describe, in section 2, 
the concept of scientific plurality used here, in order to be able to distinguish 
between ‘axiomatic variation’ and ‘genuine plurality.’ This will also allow us to 
categorize other terms often used in this context: ‘mainstream,’ ‘orthodoxy,’ 
‘dissenter’ and ‘heterodoxy.’ In section 3 we trace the paradigmatic development 
of economics in Germany (in light of the object of this study, pluralism), and its 
position in the universities, in the institutional context of changing structures of 
university governance. The focus, then, is exclusively on the academic discipline 
of economics, as represented by professorial positions at public universities.7 In 
                                                           
3
 Particular prominence was attained by the question the Queen of England put to her econo-
mists in the British Academy of Science: why, she asked, was there not sufficient warning of the 
global financial crisis? (cf. Besley/Hennessy 2009). But German Chancellor Angela Merkel ex-
pressed similar criticisms at the 5
th
 Lindau conference of Nobel laureates in economics (cf. Merkel 
2014). 
4
 The list of studies dealing with this is long. To give a small selection: Davis (1994), Backhouse 
(2001), King (2002a), Kellert/Longino/Waters (2006).  
5
 The list of relevant appeals is equally long: see e.g. Auroi et al. (2011), Chesney et al. (2011), 
Thielemann et al. (2012). There are also numerous appeals from students, such as the ‘Petition 
Autisme Economique’ in 2000, ‘opening up economics’ by the Cambridge 27 in 2001, and the 
latest appeal, ‘An international student call for pluralism in economics’ by the International Stu-
dent Initiative for Pluralism in Economics (2014). 
6
 A new survey at the beginning of the 2000s showed that 80% of the economists surveyed now 
based their views on neoclassical economics – and these were significantly more young econo-
mists than old ones close to retirement (cf. Frey/Humbert/Schneider 2007). A similar develop-
ment can also be observed for the USA, however; cf. Colander/Klamer (1987) und Klamer (2007: 
230).  
7
 Private universities, the first of which were established in the mid-1980s, cannot be taken into 
consideration here. This is because of the limited access to reliable data, but also because of the 
completely marginal influence they have had so far in Germany. Universities of applied sciences 
(Fachhochschulen) are not examined because they are not authorized to award doctorates and 
therefore cannot contribute to the reproduction of scientific paradigms.  
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section 4 we will seek explanations for this development in an unpretentious 
Bourdieuian analytical framework. Section 5, finally, gives a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Plurality versus variation 
 
From a philosophy of science perspective, the concept of ‘plurality’ or ‘pluralism’ 
is opaque. Sometimes there is talk of a plurality of methods, sometimes of theo-
retical or paradigmatic pluralism. Following the concept of pluralism found in 
critical rationalism, and the philosophy of science principles of the theorists of 
pluralism, Imre Lakatos (1978) and Paul Feyerabend (1975), plurality is to be un-
derstood here as a multitude of paradigms, in the sense of a ‘battle of the para-
digms’ for a better interpretation or approximation of reality. Using Lakatos’s 
scientific research program (srp)8 as a frame of reference, the following dimen-
sions of classification can be described: (cf. Tab. 1): 1) a particular methodology, 
which is regarded as acceptable (and therefore scientific); 2) in epistemological 
terms, it is possible to identify certain core assumptions (axioms) underlying the 
formation of models; 3) a ‘negative heuristic,’ according to which the postulates 
of the research program, which have been derived from the core assumptions, 
are not (allowed to be) called into question.  
 
The DSGE mainstream – which is made up of new classical macroeconomics and 
neo-Keynesianism9 – is unanimously based on the core assumptions that charac-
terize the paradigm of social exchange theory. These are rationality, ergodicity 
and substitutionality (cf. Davidson 1984), the exclusive acceptance of a formal 
mathematical-deductive, positivist reductionism (cf. Lawson 2006). After the 
‘empirical turn’ of the last two or three decades, these have been combined with 
sophisticated micro- and macro-econometrics, or with experimental arrange-
ments (cf. Schmidt/ aus dem Moore 2010), such as are familiar from the leading 
natural sciences (physics and chemistry). The postulate of stability and optimality 
(acceptance of Walras’s law), which is implemented a priori in the core assump-
tions, serves as a ‘model solution,’ and thus functions as a marker of a negative 
heuristic (cf. Sargent 1979: 67 – 70). The apparently very different model progno-
ses of new classical macroeconomics (hyper-balanced and hyper-stable) on the 
one hand, and of standard and neo-Keynesianism (unbalanced, open to interven-
tion) on the other hand are based on changes to assumptions in the ‘protective 
belt’ (e.g. about the speed of adjustment, the rigidity of prices and quantities, 
                                                           
8
 For the problems involved in translating Lakatos's concept to economics, see Cross (1982). For 
an overview of the discussion on the application of philosophy of science concepts to economics, 
see Drakopoulos/Karayiannis (2005). 
9
 Combining (neo-)Keynesian and neoclassical models in a single paradigm may sound strange to 
some readers, but will hopefully become plausible when discussed in more detail below. As Da-
vidson (1992; 2005) has shown, placing these in the same paradigm highlights the unsuitability of 
the use of the term ‘Keynesian’ for neo-Keynesian models (which can thus be seen as fraudulent 
labeling). 
 
5 
 
the formation of expectations etc.), but do not actually point to a different para-
digmatic origin of the two schools of theory.10 It is important to understand that 
the heuristic device of market stability as ‘model solution’ does neither preclude 
the existence of disequilibria as theoretical outcome based on particular assump-
tions (i.e. due to factors located in the epistemological dimension of paradigms) 
nor the use of non-equilibrium approaches in the methodological dimension as 
long as such disequilibria are covered by Walras’s law (cf. Arthur 2010: 164; 
Greenfield 1986).    
 
Criticism of the core assumptions of the mainstream is occasionally answered 
with the argument that these are still valid for the DSGE model used in education 
and training, but not for the model used in research. The latter, it is argued, has 
long since incorporated approaches from behavioral economics, neuroeconomics 
or the economics of complexity, and assumptions of, for example, limited ration-
ality. Since the proponents of these approaches – sometimes referred to as ‘dis-
senters,’ sometimes as the ‘periphery’ – accept the (often methodological) limi-
tations of the mainstream, and (observing the ‘negative heuristic’) do not ven-
ture to voice any fundamental criticism of the mainstream as a ‘model solu-
tion,’11 they are recognized by the mainstream,12 and occasionally even held up 
                                                           
10
 Consequently, both approaches can be found in modern textbooks, with a distinction being 
made between short term (neo-Keynesian model) and long term (neoclassical model); cf. e.g. 
Abel/Bernanke (2005); Blanchard/Johnson  (2013). Especially noteworthy is information econom-
ics, which also shares the core assumptions and methodology of the mainstream, but nonethe-
less rejects the ideal of stability and optimality as a negative heuristic. This apparently incon-
sistent finding is not based on the proof of deductive weaknesses in the theoretical derivation of 
the postulates of stability and optimality, but in the special emphasis placed on the distribution 
of information to economic subjects (who are no longer permitted to be seen as representative 
agents). This is raised to the rank of a – divergent – core assumption.   
11
 ‘Loyalty’ to the mainstream is attested either by refusing to generalize the proof one has just 
given of the untenability of certain assumptions (mostly the assumption of rationality) (cf. Smith 
(2002, p. 505) for behavioral economics), or by explicitly stating that this is not an alternative to 
the dominant mainstream, but simply an addition (cf. e.g. Hermann-Pillath (2002, p. 21) for evo-
lutionary economics and Arrow (1988: 275ff.), Blume/Durlauf (2001) and Arthur (2010) for com-
plexity economics). This may be why Colander/Holt/Rosser (2004) view these approaches as the 
‘changing face of mainstream economics’ rather than a paradigm shift. However, there are other 
voices which are more inclined to rate some of these ‘dissenters’ (particularly the evolutionary 
and complexity economists) as heterodox: cf e.g. Barkley Rosser (2004) and Fontana (2008). This 
difference in judgement may be due to different conceptions of complexity (cf. Bronk 2011): 
those, who refer to ‘epistemological complexity’ highlight the fact that no economic agent has 
the ability to collect and process all the information necessary to act fully rational – the world is 
simply too complicated. Those, however, who refer to ‘ontological complexity’ highlight the fact 
that not all information – particularly those about future events – are available because they are 
part of human action – i.e. the world is complex (to the dimension n) in the sense that it is an 
open system (with n possible paths of evolution). The former conception appears to be reconcil-
able with mainstream economics, while the latter appears to be irreconcilable. Therefore, we 
have rated evolutionary and complexity economics partly as (dissenters from) mainstream, partly 
as heterodox.      
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as the dynamic front line of mainstream research (cf. Colander/Holt/Rosser 
2009).13 The same does not apply to those dissenters within the mainstream who 
share its core axioms and the optimistic belief in stability and optimality, but not 
the methodological requirements of a rigorous formal deductivism. The econom-
ics of order (Ordnungsökonomik), but also the ‘Austrian school,’ based on the 
work of Hayek, are largely marginalized as worthy, but methodologically weak 
and no longer up-to-date (cf. Schmidt/aus dem Moore 2010, pp. 170ff.). 
 
Table 1: Classification  of economic paradigms 
Epistemology 
(Core axioms) 
Methodology Heuristic Paradigm Theoretical 
school 
- rationality 
- ergodicity 
- substitutionality 
Formal mathematical 
deductive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
empiricism/ experi-
mentalism 
Acceptance of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a ‘model   
solution’ 
DSGE - New classical mac-
roeconomics 
- Neo-Keynesianism 
- Standard Keynesian-
ism 
Questioning of some 
of the core assump-
tions 
Formal mathematical 
deductive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
empiricism/ experi-
mentalism 
Acceptance of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a ‘model   
solution’ 
DSGE dissenters  - Behavioral econom-
ics 
- Neuroeconomics 
- Economics of com-
plexity (partly) 
-Evolutionary eco-
nomics (partly) 
- rationality 
- ergodicity 
- substitutionality 
Rejection of formal 
mathematical deduc-
tive, positivist reduc-
tionism 
Acceptance of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a ‘model   
solution’ 
DSGE dissenters - Economics of order 
- Austrian school 
 
- rationality 
- ergodicity 
- substitutionality 
- asymmetric distri-
bution of infor-
mation 
Formal mathematical 
deductive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
empiricism/ experi-
mentalism 
Rejection of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a ‘model   
solution’ 
Dissenters/ hetero-
doxy 
- Information econom-
ics 
Questioning of some 
of the core assump-
tions 
Acceptance of formal 
mathematical deduc-
tion + narrative 
analysis 
Rejection of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a ‘model   
solution’ 
Heterodoxy - Post-Keynesianism 
- Social economics/ 
social-economic 
institutionalism 
- Regulation theory/ 
Marxism 
-Evolutionary eco-
nomics (partly) 
-Economics of com-
plexity (partly)  
-  rationality 
- ergodicity 
- substitutionality 
 
Formal mathematical 
deductive, positivist 
reductionism + 
highly developed 
Rejection of the 
stability of market 
clearing as a ‘model   
solution’ 
Heterodoxy - Neo-Ricardianism 
                                                                                                                                                               
12
 This means, primarily, that representatives of these approaches are able to publish their work 
in the major mainstream journals (which are, in turn, part of the economic and symbolic capital 
of a paradigm). 
13
 Both Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ and Lakatos’s ‘scientific research programs’ are terminologically am-
biguous. Here we wish to understand the concepts as efforts to explain the economy as a whole, 
in which all aspects of economics are embedded – theories of the labor market, distribution and 
growth, as well as theories of foreign trade, money or finance. From this perspective, however, it 
seems questionable whether, for example, behavioral economics or the economics of complexity 
actually constitute independent paradigms, or whether they are just partial theories, which may 
in some cases have connections to various paradigms (see footnote 11). 
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empiricism/ experi-
mentalism 
 
Heterodoxy is characterized by the rejection of some (or all) of the mainstream 
axioms, methodological openness to less formal, narrative deductions and induc-
tive techniques, and, consequently, the repudiation of the stability and optimali-
ty of the market coordination solution (repudiation of Walras’s law14). Theoreti-
cal schools that can undoubtedly be regarded as heterodox include post-
Keynesianism, neo-Marxist regulation theory and theories of social economy15. 
Neo-Ricardianism, which goes back to Piero Sraffa, also conceives itself as heter-
odox, since its proponents reject the mainstream postulate of stability and opti-
mality, while nonetheless accepting the research methodology and core axioms 
of the mainstream. This apparently inconsistent result can be explained by the 
fact that the neo-Ricardians, in the so-called Cambridge Capital Controversy 
(CCC), provided the proof that the stable equilibrium solutions based on the core 
assumptions of the DSGE mainstream, which are also shared (or at least not 
called into question) by the neo-Ricardians, are only valid in very limited circum-
stances.16 In short, this rocked the entire deductive foundation of the main-
stream – but without offering any plausible alternative. 
 
The dual classification into orthodoxy/mainstream and heterodoxy/non-
mainstream has the advantage of allowing clear distinctions between model-
theory-based variations within a paradigm (i.e. intraparadigmatic plurality, which 
can also encompass the so-called ‘dissenters’) and interparadigmatic plurality. 
Heuristics turn out to be a key point of differentiation: only those models and 
theories that do not question the heuristic of the DSGE – i.e. the postulate of 
stability manifested in Walras’s law as a ‘model solution’ – are ortho-
dox/mainstream or are accepted by the mainstream, and only those models and 
theories that explicitly reject this heuristic can be regarded as heterodox/non-
                                                           
14
 The insight that a real paradigmatic alternative implies the rejection of Walras’s law goes back 
to Robert Clower (1965). But even before that, ‘heterodox’ economists such as Karl Marx or 
Thomas Robert Malthus had begun to question the classical predecessor of Walras’s law, Say’s 
law; for the relationship between Walras’s law and Say’s law, see Mishan (1963). 
15
 We have already pointed out the ambigious position of evolutionary and complexity 
economics. Sometimes, feminist and ecological economics are also ranked among the heterodox 
approaches (cf. Dobusch/Kapeller 2012) – however, these research programmes are obviously 
different as they are not necessarily ordered around shared epistemological, methodological and 
heuristic dimensions but rather a shared subject of inquiry. As much as ‘international economics’ 
or ‘labor economics’ is neither per se heterodox nor mainstream, ‘feminist economics’ or 
‘ecological economics’ would only be counted as heterodox once heterodox approaches are 
applied (which, however, is often the case).     
16
 One would have to either live in a one-commodity world (such as Ricardo’s corn economy), or 
make specific assumptions about the capital intensity of the subsistence commodity industry and 
all of its input producers – neither of which is especially realistic. 
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mainstream17. In this sense, real plurality, in contrast to ‘axiomatic variation,’ 
means the acceptance of all heuristics – orthodox and heterodox – that are 
based on rigorous modeling, which can be intersubjectively reconstructed and 
empirically falsified. 
 
3. Development of economics in West Germany after 1945  
 
With Hesse (2007; 2010), we can observe that economics and business studies 
were subject to multiple layers of development at German universities in the 
post-war years:  
a) The number of students of Wirtschaftswissenschaften (economics + busi-
ness studies) exploded from around 9000 in 1950 to 31,000 in 1965 (= + 
244%), then to 52,000 in the 1974/75 winter semester (= + 68%).18 To 
begin with, the number of professors did not keep pace, rising only from 
54 in 1950 to 78 in 1960 (= + 44%). With the wave of new institutions be-
ing founded, however, this number also rose quite considerably by the 
mid-1970s, to 243 (= + 211%) giving young researchers an extremely 
powerful position in the market for academic economists (cf. Hesse 2007: 
125). From the mid-1970s, this picture changed dramatically – access for 
young academics was now more or less blocked until around the end of 
the 1990s.19 
b) The formalization and mathematization of the discipline was accompa-
nied by a methodological and epistemological ‘professionalization,’ which 
was meant to allow economics to rise to the rank of a Leitwissenschaft or 
leading science (at least among the social sciences) (cf. e.g. Schipper 
2013). Since this process was mainly driven by the US, the new scientific 
hegemon, it is often referred to as ‘Americanization.’ However, in view of 
the efforts of German economists to catch up with developments that 
had been missed during the Nazi period (especially the younger genera-
tion, most of whom had been trained in the US), it can also be under-
stood at least in part as a process of ‘self-Americanization’ (cf. Hesse 
2007: 128f.; Rosser/Holt/Colander 2010: 8). 
                                                           
17
 Drawing the demarcation line between heterodox and orthodox schools of thought in such a 
way allows to avoid the counter-intuative results of, for instance, having to rate Neoricardianism 
as orthodox or Austrian economics as heterodox as would be the case if the methodological 
requirement of formalism would be the distinctive ingredient as advocated by Lawson (2006) or 
if heterodoxy would simply be taken as a „collection of different, non-neoclassical schools of 
thought“ (Dobusch/Kapeller 2012: 1036).  
18
 Due to a change in the classification system in 1972, the student numbers are not completely 
comparable over time.   
19
  During the wave of foundation of new institutions, around 70 per cent of Assistenten (research 
assistants/ junior researchers) had a chance of gaining a professorship. Once these new institu-
tions had been founded, from the mid-1970s, only 9 per cent of them had this chance; cf. 
Finkenstaedt (2010: 157).  
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c) Separation of economics from legal studies (previously combined in facul-
ties of Staatswissenschaften, literally ‘state sciences’), and internal spe-
cialization within economics faculties. 
 
The aspect of professionalization, in conjunction with self-Americanization, re-
quires further attention here20. On the one hand, this reflects the largely normal 
development of a science from the pre-paradigmatic stage to that of a more ‘ma-
ture’ science (cf. Kuhn 1970: 256ff.). On the other hand, however, professionali-
zation also refers here to the transition from an evaluative normativism (‘advo-
cacy’) to a (supposedly) objective positivism (‘objectivity’) – especially in light of 
the ongoing development of empirical testing methods, and the emergence of 
econometrics. The driving force of this development originally lay in the US, in 
the attempt to gain legitimation and acceptance for an academic discipline that 
was still in its infancy. Since – in contrast to Europe and in particular Germany – it 
was not the institution of the university that give the discipline or its representa-
tives the necessary legitimation, generally accepted scientific criteria such as 
rigor and epistemological exactness had to be borrowed from other, successful 
disciplines (‘leading sciences’) – especially, of course, the natural sciences (cf. 
Busch 1959: 80ff.; Mirowski 1989). Thus formalization, axiomatization, and em-
pirical monitoring were taken as the methodological and epistemological bound-
aries of what was legitimately allowed to call itself economics (cf. Fourcade-
Gourinchas 2001: 426). Since, however, the process of knowledge acquisition is 
culturally bound, professionalization also implies a heuristic demarcation of 
boundaries: the special social position of the market as an instrument of coordi-
nation and a meritocratic justification for economic distribution outcomes in the 
US meant that an academic discipline hoping to gain social acceptance could not 
afford to fundamentally challenge the superiority of the market over other 
mechanisms of coordination and distribution (cf. Fourcade 2009: 35ff., 78ff.).21 
The equilibrium and welfare economics developing at the end of the 19th centu-
ry, based on the work of Jevons, Menger, Walras and Pareto, increasingly re-
placed American institutionalism as the dominant paradigm in US economics. 
                                                           
20
 One referee was surprised to read so much about the development of economics in the US in a 
chapter on the development of economics in West Germany. However, the US hegemony in 
science in general and economics in particular has long been confirmed (cf. Graham/Diamond 
1997, Rosser/Holt/Colander 2010) and it can certainly not be ignored for the evolution of 
economics in Germany after World War 2. The same referee critized ‚self-Americanization‘ as too 
individualistic a conception and referred to alternative explanations such as the cold war 
environment (cf. Garnett 2006). Although it certainly cannot be claimed that any evolutionary 
process is one-dimensional (cf. Backhouse 2005: 384), it must be stressed that it is the 
ontological process of forming a ‚normal science‘ in economics which is considered here not the 
ideological process of the rise of free market economics within that paradigma.     
21
 An American business journalist sums it up neatly: “To be an economist in the United States, 
you have to believe that the market works most of the time. The situation in which markets don’t 
work, or cannot be made to work, is really quite exceptional, and not all that interesting to study” 
(Fourcade 2009: 61). 
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Although the German university as an institution, and the professor as a ‘manda-
rin,’ had lost much of their authority after the experiences of the Nazi period, 
and were subjected to further challenges, especially during the student move-
ment, the phenomenon of ‘self-Americanization’ is probably to be ascribed more 
to German economists’ feelings of inferiority in the international context22 than 
to any urgent need to acquire legitimacy in the national social and political are-
na.23 What happened, then, was an importing of norms which had no cultural 
basis in Germany – but which are defended, to this day, by those scholars who 
reject the idea of greater methodological openness.24 Astonishingly, the argu-
ment given is that specific national approaches (nationale Sonderwege) would 
undermine the international competitiveness of German economists. 
 
Although the theoretical foundations of equilibrium and welfare economics were 
laid in the second half of the 19th century, and came to occupy a dominant posi-
tion in Great Britain,25 it is nonetheless the period after the Second World War 
that has to be seen as the real phase of professionalization of economics, in the 
sense used above – and in both politics and academia, this phase was mainly 
dominated by one economist: John Maynard Keynes (cf. Solow 1986; Snow-
don/Vane 1997). The construction of macroeconomic theories on the basis of 
Keynes’s magnum opus – the General Theory (Keynes 1936) – left room not only 
for formalization and econometric expansion,26 but also for appropriation by the 
(neo-)classical orthodoxy which Keynes had criticized.27 Keynesian principles of 
economic management also allowed a promising combination of scientific objec-
tivity and added value for society. The sentence ascribed to Paul Samuelson, “We 
are all Keynesians now,” was roughly applicable to West Germany in the 1960s, 
where just over two thirds of the available professorships had been filled, even 
straight after the war, by academics who had completed their Habilitation either 
after 1945 (one third) or between 1933 and 1945 (another third) (cf. Hesse 2010: 
                                                           
22
 Hesse (2010: 320ff.) refers to a large number of sources that show these feelings of inferiority, 
thus suggesting that Americanization was part of a semantics of progress.   
23
 The German ‘economics of order’ (Ordnungsökonomik), which still resists the claims to 
axiomatization and formalization made by mainstream economics, was quite influential in the 
early phase of West Germany history (cf. among others Ptak 2004: 155ff.).  
24
 Rosser/Holt/Colander (2010: 18) bemoan this US-centeredness as a source of second-class 
imitation rather than first-class innovation. 
25
 This is due, in particular, to the position of Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil Pigous at one of the 
world’s foremost elite universities at the time. Thus there was already talk of ‘orthodoxy’ (cf. 
Keynes 1936: V) or of a ‘citadelle’ (cf. Keynes 1934: 488) in the first quarter of the 20
th
 century. 
26
 In the US, Lawrence Klein was arguably one of the most important exponents of the combina-
tion of econometrics and Keynesian macroeconomics. 
27
 John Hicks’s well-known IS-LM model can be seen as formalizing Keynesianism and reconciling 
it with neoclassical orthodoxy. Paul A. Samuelson eventually became the most prominent and 
influential representative of this “neoclassical synthesis,” the harmonization of Keynes and neo-
classical theory, in the US. In Germany, this version of Keynesianism was mainly propagated by 
Erich Schneider, Erich Preiser, Fritz Neumark and Karl Schiller. 
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191). The 1960s, however, saw the beginning of a process that would intensify in 
the 1970s, the struggle for paradigmatic supremacy – the second phase in the 
maturation process of economics, in the sense of the contested emergence of a 
‘normal science.’ On the one hand, the voices questioning the neoclassical syn-
thesis as the standard interpretation of Keynesianism were growing louder; the-
se critics saw it instead as a ‘bastard Keynesianism’ (Joan Robinson), which could 
not claim to give an accurate rendering of Keynesian macroeconomics. On the 
other hand, the Italian economist Piero Sraffa, a member of the circle surround-
ing Keynes, had published a slim volume in 1960 (Sraffa 1960), which dealt a se-
vere blow to neoclassical equilibrium economics. He did this by pointing out de-
ductive inconsistences in the central argumentative field of neoclassical econom-
ics (and of the neoclassical synthesis): the price-based mechanism of equilibrium 
undoubtedly only works under unrealistic conditions. For the acceptance of a 
paradigm in a science that lays claim to exactness and rigor as its basis for legiti-
mation, deductive weaknesses had to be fatal.28 In addition to this, Sraffa set out 
to remedy the central weakness of classical political economy – the objective 
theory of value – with the formally exact description of an invariant measure of 
value. This led to a renaissance of classical political economy of Ricardian, but 
also Marxist provenance, whose proponents criticized not only the theoretical 
weaknesses of neoclassical equilibrium economics, but also its tenuous link with 
reality (cf. Vogt 1973: 12). 
 
The German physicist and Nobel laureate Max Planck (1928: 22) argued that new 
scientific insights do not become widely accepted because the proponents of the 
old paradigm change their minds, but because they grow old and disappear, and 
because the next generation of scholars are familiar with the new paradigm. In 
keeping with this, the sudden increase in chairs and professorships during the 
wave of new universities, and the not-yet completed generational changeover in 
the existing (‘old’) universities, can be seen as an institutional starting point for a 
potential pluralization of economics in Germany. At first glance, the reform of 
the German higher education landscape taking place at the same time as the 
‘battle of the paradigms’ had more to do with organizational structures and edu-
cational objectives. On the level of economics faculties or departments, howev-
er, ideas of reform relating to socio-political orientation can certainly be linked 
with a type of economics that saw itself as an alternative to neoclassical equilib-
rium economics, even in its standard Keynesian version, or which at least called 
for pluralistic openness in the ‘battle of the paradigms.’ 
                                                           
28
 The ‘fightback’ against the alleged theoretical falsification, in defense of the embattled neo-
classical position, was initially led by Paul A. Samuelson and Robert Solow, later by Christopher 
Bliss and Frank Hahn. Although they had to acknowledge the validity of the criticism put forward 
by Sraffa, they were so successful in downplaying the significance of this controversy for the rigor 
of neoclassical equilibrium theory that Sraffa is now not even mentioned in studies on the devel-
opment of modern macroeconomics, let alone in standard textbooks; cf. Cohen/Hartcourt 
(2003).    
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In the founding phase of new universities in the 1960s and 1970s, a paradigmatic 
opening-up of economics coincided with the organizational opening-up of uni-
versities, especially certain ‘reform’ universities (Reformuniversitäten), which 
created space to consolidate the process of pluralization by appointing profes-
sors. Due to high demand for professorial candidates, which the existing supply 
of habilitierte Privatdozenten could not even come close to meeting29, the elite 
system ‘university’ temporarily opened up. Recruitment practices based on habit 
and social structures were replaced by practices based on science and research 
policy,30 particularly in those universities that had been founded as part of a 
movement to reform society, but also in universities – even traditional ones – 
where representatives of the students or research assistants had substantial in-
volvement in decision-making, thanks to the short-lived principle of Drittelparität 
(one-third parity) in the governing bodies of the university. The university system 
at the beginning of the 1970s can be roughly divided into the following catego-
ries:31 1) traditional old universities with little likelihood of pluralization, 2) old 
universities where reform-oriented status groups have a strong influence; low to 
medium likelihood of pluralization, 3) newly founded universities, designed to 
relieve pressure on existing universities, no aspirations to reform; low likelihood 
of pluralization, 4) newly founded universities based on Humboldt’s ideal32, low 
likelihood of pluralization, 5) newly founded universities with aspirations to re-
form in relation to social openness and practical relevance; medium likelihood of 
pluralization, and 6) newly founded universities with aspirations to socio-political 
reform; high likelihood of pluralization (cf. Tab. 2). 
 
Table 2: University status and likelihood of pluralization to be expected 
 Classification Likelihood of pluralization 
1 Traditional ‘old university’ 
 
Low 
2 Old universities strongly influenced by reform-oriented 
status groups  low-medium 
3 Newly founded universities, designed to relieve pressure on 
existing universities, no reform aspirations Low 
                                                           
29
 In the mid-1970s, around one fifth of all university professors had not completed a Habilitation 
(the ordinary formal qualification required to become university professor; see footnote 33); cf. 
Hesse (2007: 124).  
30
 Cf. von der Vring (1975: 113 and 262), Gräfing (2012: 72ff.). What occasionally happened, how-
ever (at the University of Bielefeld, for example), was that other humanities faculties intervened 
in the recruitment process for individual chairs in economics, under the slogan of 
‘interdisciplinarity.’ This probably led to a different orientation than would have been the case if 
only economists had been involved.  
31
 For more on this and on the coding of the university types and their likelihood of pluralization, 
see Heise et al. (2015: 74ff.). 
32
 The University of Bielefeld and Konstanz University were founded with the explicit objective to 
create small-sized, research-oriented ‘elite’ universities adopting the ideals of 19
th
 century 
German university reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
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4 Newly founded universities based on Humboldt’s ideal Low 
5 Newly founded universities with aspirations to reform in 
relation to social openness and practical relevance Medium 
6 Newly founded universities with aspirations to socio-
political reform High 
 
The upshot of this is that we cannot expect any nationwide pluralization of eco-
nomics as an academic discipline in Germany, but a heterogenization of both the 
access routes and the paradigmatic orientation of the professorships, with con-
siderable regional variation. This, but also the bypassing of the Habilitation as the 
normal path to a professorship,33 temporarily made it impossible to close the 
elite system of the university ‘from below,’ i.e. with a qualification requirement 
monitored by the system itself. This led to pressure for standardization, linking 
recruitment to self-determined standards. Whether this form of closing the sys-
tem ‘from above’ reproduces the heterogeneity which is to be expected, perhaps 
even extending it spatially, or whether it instead leads back to a broad paradig-
matic homogeneity, depends very much on the developments on the ‘battlefield 
of the paradigms.’ It also depends, of course, on the range of possible disposi-
tions in the field of power of ‘economics.’ The battlefield of the paradigms saw a 
wave of further developments of orthodoxy: from monetarism and new classical 
macroeconomics to neo-Keynesian modeling and, finally, the new neoclassical 
synthesis. Alongside this, however, a few ‘dissenters’ also emerged, variations on 
the neo-classical mainstream, who differed from the mainstream in their epis-
temology or methodologies but not their heuristics: neo-Austrian, neo-
Schumpeterian, neo-institutionalist theories and, more recently, behavioral and 
complexity economic approaches. Heterodoxy developed various post-Keynesian 
and left-Keynesian positions,34 neo-Marxist theories such as the (French) regula-
tion school or the (American) ‘social structure of accumulation’ approach. In 
Germany, however, the latter received little attention, and no professorial back-
ing within economics departments.35 In his history of post-Keynesian economics, 
John King (2002: 140) claims that there was no significant group of post-
Keynesian economists in Germany, but that “…neoclassical orthodoxy rules…”. 
Fred Lee (2009), in his history of heterodox economics, also comes to the conclu-
sion that – in terms of the number of heterodox economists – Germany plays a 
fairly unimportant role both internationally and in Europe. The following sections 
will investigate the reasons for this. 
 
                                                           
33
 On the one hand, this is a unique feature of the German-language university system, which is 
not internationally relevant. On the other hand, alternative recruitment paths via junior profes-
sorships and so-called ‘tenure-track’ systems have not yet been able to make any great headway 
against the path dependencies of tradition; cf. Bloch/Burkhardt (2011).  
34
 For a more exact description of the heterodox research programs in Germany, see Heise (2010: 
36f.). 
35
 If at all, these paradigms were represented in social science faculties or departments (e.g. at 
the University of Frankfurt). 
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4. The marginalization of heterodoxy after 1970  
 
At the end of the 1960s, many economists (especially younger ones) felt that 
their discipline was in a crisis, and therefore believed that they were on the 
verge of a scientific revolution. Their point of reference here was the frequently 
quoted text by the philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn (cf. Kuhn 1962). Such 
an ‘attack’ on the ‘dominant economics’ was only possible because of the efforts 
made over the previous two decades to ‘mature’ economics into a paradigmatic 
science. Its microeconomic core in general equilibrium theory had been decisive-
ly summarized by Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu and Frank Hahn, and its mac-
roeconomic superstructure described theories of economic cycles and growth 
with a standard Keynesian focus. The massive expansion of the university system 
in Germany from the mid-1960s seemed to offer the chance to achieve a para-
digm shift without waiting for the generational changeover which Max Planck 
had seen as the precondition for such cases. Instead it seemed possible to bring 
about a faster transition to the new paradigm by recruiting the younger genera-
tion, “which is familiar with the truth from the start” (Planck 1928: 22; own 
translation). The reliance on Kuhn, however, seems unfortunate. On the one 
hand, this is because the ‘empirical anomaly’ – the major economic crisis of the 
1930s, as the basis of a state of crisis – was already so long ago that collective 
memory in the middle of the ‘golden age of capitalism’ had long since sup-
pressed it. On the other hand, the ‘logical anomaly’ – the evidence of theoretical 
inconsistency provided in the framework of the Cambridge Capital Controversy – 
could not fulfill the conditions of a constructive alternative which Kuhn had seen 
as necessary to trigger a paradigm shift. Hence Imre Lakatos’s concept of com-
peting ‘scientific research programs’ seems better suited to examining the de-
velopment of economics in general and heterodox economics in particular. This 
is especially true if one insists, like Paul Feyerabend, that this ‘battlefield’ – at 
least in the social sciences – cannot be objectively divided into ‘progressive’ and 
‘degenerate’ research programs, and that paradigmatic plurality (‘anything goes’) 
should be allowed. From such a perspective, the ‘field of power’ in which the 
battle of the paradigms is fought becomes particularly important: to borrow 
from Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory (cf. Bourdieu 1990, Bourdieu 1986), a para-
digmatic development would then not be tied to objective (Kuhn) or objectifiable 
criteria (Lakatos), but would mainly depend on the actors’ endowment with or 
access to different forms of capital such as economic, social, symbolic or cultural 
capital36. 
 
                                                           
36
 A truly in-depth Bourdieuian analysis taking all different forms of capital endowment and the 
personal biographies (‚habitus‘) of heterodox and orthodox economists into account cannot be 
offered here – Bourdieu himself was quite aware about the limitations in application of his field 
theory; cf. Bourdieu (1995: 184).  
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The next step will be to show that the hope of a broad opening up of theoretical 
approaches, or a paradigmatic change in what was from then on to be under-
stood as ‘dominant economics’ (mainstream, normal science), was not able to be 
fulfilled even after the quantitative expansion and the substantive reform of the 
German university system from the mid-1960s.37 Instead, the old universities 
largely closed themselves to this pluralization despite the generational changeo-
ver and the quantitative expansion – except in those cases where there were 
effective promoters such as active student bodies and representatives of the 
Mittelbau (non-tenured academic staff), who, with the institutional support of 
the short-lived system of Drittelparität (one-third parity), influenced the way 
professors were recruited. The example of the University of Bonn shows that 
recruiters were willing to put up with longer vacancies or a certain fluctuation, in 
order to restrict intake to those (junior) researchers who conformed to the disci-
plinary culture that was developing there at the time (mathematization). The 
result was an extremely unequal pluralization of economics at German universi-
ties (cf. the following Tab. 3 and 
Figure 1). At traditional old universities and at those new universities that had 
been founded solely to expand capacity, and were largely without aspirations to 
reform, heterodox economists could only be appointed by chance, or these 
scholars only developed a heterodox orientation after their appointment. The 
chances of pluralism were somewhat higher when the relevant promoters en-
countered a ‘culture of openness,’ internal organizational democracy, and exter-
nal political support, as for example at the University of Frankfurt, where a chair 
in ‘Marxist economic theory’ was even established, or at the FU Berlin, where 
several heterodox professors were appointed.  
 
Table 3: Relative frequency of heterodox economists 
Classification 
Locations 
(number) 
Heterodox 
economists 
(number) 
Heterodox 
economists 
per location  
Not classified (traditional old university) 
 
43 13 0.3 
Newly founded university based on Humboldt’s 
ideal 2 4 2 
New university founded to relieve pressure on exist-
ing institutions, no aspirations to reform 12 1 0.1 
                                                           
37
 The following statements are based on a comprehensive survey of all economics professors at 
economics departments or faculties in German universities from 1954 onwards as published in 
the various editions of the Vademecum deutscher Lehr- und Forschungsstätten and a postal sur-
vey of all (living) economists that had been identified as heterodox (to be counted as heterodox 
one needed to have published at least one book/article based on theories classified as heterodox 
in Tab. 1.). The response rate (47,8%) and the distribution of respondents across the different 
types of universities (see Tab. 2) allow us to take the results as fairly representative. Additionally, 
an in-depth comparison between a selected heterodox economics department (University of 
Bremen as heterodox stronghold) and an orthodox one (University of Bonn as orthodox strong-
hold) has been made; cf. Heise at al. (2015).  
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Old university strongly influenced by groups with 
socio-political orientation 6 8 1.3 
Newly founded university with aspirations to reform 
in relation to social openness and practical relevance 8 12 1.5 
Newly founded university with aspirations to reform 
in relation to socio-political orientation 2 15 7.5 
∑ 73 53  
Average 
  0.8 
 
At the ‘comprehensive universities’ (Gesamthochschulen38) in North Rhine-
Westphalia and Hesse, which saw themselves as ‘reform’ universities with a fo-
cus on practical relevance, professorial recruitment policies could allow hetero-
dox economists to be taken into consideration – depending on specific local cir-
cumstances such as the position of the founding dean and the personnel policies 
at the predecessor institutions. The crucial factor here was the expectation that 
those economists who stood for (social) reforms and practical relevance – i.e. 
critical or heterodox economists – could be better for a reform university than 
those economists who stood for the preservation of the traditional university 
model with its claims to value-neutral science – i.e. the mainstream economists. 
At the two reform universities with socio-political aspirations – the University of 
Bremen and the Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Politik (HWP) in Hamburg – these 
aspects came together in a way that was particularly favorable for pluralism, and 
thus permitted the emergence of two bastions of heterodoxy. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of heterodox economists in the university field; 1954 - 2013 
                                                           
38
 The German sytem of higher education falls under authority of the German Bundesländer. 
Some Bundesländer – namely those ruled by social-democratic governments at the time – 
experimented with a new form of higher education institution: the ‘comprehensive university’ 
which combinded academic units of universty status with academic units of ‘Fachhochschul’ 
status (‘universities of applied science’ which are the German pendant to British polytechnics and 
US liberal arts collges).  
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Figure 2: Professorial appointments of heterodox economists 1954 to 2013 
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At three quarters of all German universities with economics faculties or depart-
ments, then, heterodox economists were virtually unrepresented; of the remain-
ing quarter, nearly 30% are to be found in the two ‘bastions’ of heterodoxy 
(Bremen and HWP). The pluralization is not only extremely unequal but quantita-
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tively limited: at no point in time could more than 10% of economics professors 
at German universities be classified as belonging to the heterodox camp. And the 
development over time only tells a story of further marginalization (cf. Fig. 2): 
The number of appointments of heterodox economists after the 1970s declined 
rapidly,39 and as the ‘first generation’ grow old and retire, their numbers are 
shrinking more and more. At the same time, heterodox economists were com-
pletely overlooked when the economics faculties of East German universities 
were effectively re-founded after the German reunification in the early 1990ies: 
out of 80 newly appointed professorships only 4 (!) could be ranked as ‘hetero-
dox’.40 And finally, of the two bastions of heterodox economics (Bremen and 
HWP), one was practically shut down as a unit for teaching undergraduate eco-
nomics, and the other was adapted to the mainstream after the generational 
changeover by being converted into another organizational unit. 
 
Economic capital endowment 
 
This story of marginalization must, however, be read with reference to the dispo-
sitions in the field of power. The community of economists exerted an enormous 
pressure to conform on their heterodox colleagues: for many years, the universi-
ties at which most of them were employed were denied membership of the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). The DFG is the major publically funded, 
self-governing organization for science and research in Germany. Members are 
German universities and research institutions. Membership is acquired through 
application and acceptance by the DFG governing bodies. Membership is re-
quired to be able to be represented in the decision-making bodies of the DFG. 
While the 2 newly founded university based on Humboldt’s idea were immedi-
ately granted DFG membership, the newly founded universities with aspiration 
to reform in relation to social openness and practical relevance had to wait 17 
years on average before being allowed into the DFG and those with aspirations 
to reform in relation to socio-political orientation had to wait 15 years (Universi-
ty of Bremen) or were never accepted as members (HWP). Therefore, heterodox 
                                                           
39
 The 1990s should not be interpreted as an ‘interim high’; instead they hint at the quantitative 
extent of ‘accidental’ appointments. The low number of heterodox appointments in the 1980s is 
due to the high degree of saturation of the university market after the wave of new universities 
had been founded.  
40
 Furthermore, three of the four heterodox professors at East German universities did not go 
through the normal appointment procedures, but are außerplanmäßige (extraordinary) 
Professoren (professorial title which universities may bestow on academics who have suitable 
qualifications for a professorship but are not actually employed as such) or arrived at their func-
tion when a university of applied science (Fachhochschule) fused with a university (or was trans-
formed into a university). Finally, the 3 heterodox professors had been appointed by those 3 
faculties or departments where the founding dean was no economist but had a different aca-
demic background (business informatics or sociology). In the other faculties or departments 
where the founding dean was a West German (mainstream) economist, heterodox economists 
had virtually no chance to be appointed.  
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economists never held influential positions within the decision-making bodies of 
the DFG. This substantially reduced their economic, social and symbolic capital.  
 
The latter is also reflected in the fact that heterodox economists – predictably – 
have poor chances of obtaining funding from the DFG, and are thus dependent 
on alternative, yet financially much scarcer, external sources. Many heterodox 
economists have submitted research proposals to the DFG, but their chance of 
success is low, or in any case lower than for applications to alternative research 
funding institutions (cf. Tab. 4): According to our survey, only 17% of DFG appli-
cations by heterodox economists were fully approved, as opposed to 57% of ap-
plications to alternative institutions. 50% of all applications to the DFG were 
completely rejected, but only 7% of applications to alternative external sources. 
This means that critical research – in the sense of ‘heterodox’ – can only really be 
achieved by means of such alternative external sources of funding. However, 
DFG funding as distinct from alternative sources of funding has acquired particu-
lar prestige, and therefore, is also becoming symbolic capital on its own. 
 
Table 4: Research funding of heterodox economists 
Institution Applied for funds 
(in %) 
Approved (in %) 
 Yes No 0 < 50% >50% All 
DFG 60 40 50 25 8 17 
Alternative 
external 
sources 
75 25 7 7 29 57 
Source: Own calculations based on Heise et al. (2015) 
 
Of particular importance for the reproducibility of a scientific paradigm is the 
‘production’ of disciples, i.e. the number of doctorates and Habilitationen which 
are successfully completed during the tenure of a professorship, creating the 
potential to recruit the next cohort of professors. Although it is also fundamen-
tally possible to complete one’s doctorate or Habilitation as an external scholar, 
the financial and human resources of an academic unit (faculty, department, 
institute or chair) are still the most significant parameter of reproducibility. This 
category of ‘economic capital’ was a further area in which the heterodox econo-
mists were not on an equal footing with the representatives of the mainstream – 
and this is vividly illustrated by a comparison between the two strongholds of 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the universities of Bonn and Bremen.41 On the one 
                                                           
41
 Despite limited information, it can be stated that fewer than 10 junior researchers received 
their Habilitation in economics at the economics department of the University of Bremen in the 
period from 1971 to 2014. In the substantially shorter period from 1984 to 2014, more than 
three times as many economists (over 30 of them) completed a Habilitation at the University of 
Bonn, and most of these went on to obtain a professorship at a German university. This goes for 
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hand, those reform universities where heterodox economists were most likely to 
be found had far fewer resources than the traditional ‘professorial’ universities 
(Ordinarienuniversitäten).42 On the other hand, in places where heterodox econ-
omists had access to comparable resources (e.g. in the case of the University of 
Bielefeld), ‘production’ of disciples was made difficult, at least at the level of the 
Habilitation. And even at those locations where reproduction was successful as 
far as the Habilitation – at old and comparatively well-resourced universities 
such as the University of Frankfurt or the FU Berlin –, those who had gained their 
Habilitation seldom achieved the breakthrough to a regular professorship. Such 
scholars have often chosen alternative strategies: emigrating, moving into pro-
fessorships at universities of applied science, or even shifting to other depart-
ments (sociology, political science).  
 
Social and symbolic capital endowment 
 
Lastly, heterodox economists quickly began networking at the beginning of the 
1970s: among others, the Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik (Working 
Group for Alternative Economic Policy, also referred to as the ‘Memogruppe’) 
and the Arbeitskreis Politische Ökonomie (AK PolÖK, Working Group for Political 
Economy) were founded, as were numerous local ‘Rote Zellen Ökonomie’ (Red 
Cells for Economics). Moreover, numerous economics and social science journals 
with pluralistic or ‘critical’ aspirations were established, including Mehrwert – 
Beiträge zur Kritik der Politische Ökonomie, Prokla – Probleme des Klassenkamp-
fes, Hefte für Politische Ökonomie, Das Argument, Leviathan – Zeitschrift für So-
zialwissenschaft and Jahrbuch für Ökonomie und Gesellschaft. However, the het-
erodox economic community never succeeded in using these networks as a base 
                                                                                                                                                               
fewer than half of those who did their Habilitation in Bremen (of which merely one could be 
identified as ‘heterodox’).  
42
 At the University of Bremen, for example, one of the elements of reform was to reduce the 
dependency of junior researchers on the chairs or professors. Sometimes professors were not 
given any postgraduate or postdoctoral research staff (wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter or 
Assistenten) at all. It was not until the mid-1980s that a turnaround in staffing policy occurred 
and the (mainly heterodox) professors were granted a small number of positions for research 
staff. According to the Statistisches Bundesamt, professors of economics in Germany had an 
average of 3.71 postgraduate and postdoctoral research staff in 2011 (cf. Stabu 2012: 96). Our 
survey of heterodox professors in Germany found an average of 2.32 research staff. The discrep-
ancy evident here in the resourcing of orthodox and heterodox professors – especially with post-
doctoral staff – is likely to have been even greater in the past: while the average level of resourc-
ing is decreasing overall (for the economists at the University of Bonn, the rate was 4-5 research 
positions per professor in the 1980s and 1990s; in the more recent past this has been considera-
bly reduced to 2-3, by the large-scale introduction of ‘junior,’ fixed-term and minimally-resourced 
professorships; cf. Heise et al. 2015), the heterodox professors tend to report a slight improve-
ment. Of course this development has to be viewed in the light of the above-mentioned zero 
endowment of many heterodox professorships in the founding phase of the reform universities, 
and a subsequent ‘normalization.’ 
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for penetrating the reviewer networks of the DFG or to establish their journals as 
reputed outlets of academic research.43  
 
True, a number of heterodox economists are involved in the Verein für 
Socialpolitik (VfS, Social Policy Association44), especially in the committees for 
evolutionary economics and the history of economic thought. In the more pres-
tigious committees for economic theory and economic policy, however, which 
play a crucial role in determining the influential members of the decision-making 
bodies of the DFG (Fachausschüsse or ‘review boards’) their involvement within 
the VfS (based on electoral selection) is minimal. And symbolic capital, the as-
sumption of important and therefore symbolic positions in scientific, economic 
or political organizations (e.g. the Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science 
and Humanities), or the scientific advisory councils of the German federal gov-
ernment or the Deutsche Bundesbank), have remained largely closed to the het-
erodox economists. Thanks to the nominating rights of the German Trade Un-
ions, two heterodox economists had been delegated to the Sachverständigenrat 
zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR, German Council 
of Economic Experts) since it was founded, but here too, their role was that of 
the outsider (cf. Kampe 1983)45.  
 
In summary, heterodox economics had to compete with mainstream economics 
in a very ‘uneven field of power.’ This development is also embedded in the in-
creasingly influential model of a competitively organized university landscape, in 
which universities compete with each other, as ‘enterprises,’ for scarce financial 
resources. This is why research, today, is not defined by a striving for knowledge, 
but by ‘usability’ (Verwertbarkeit), in the sense of the ability to attract external 
funding. This and (partly as a result of this) the lack of reproduction and consoli-
dation of heterodox structures has exacerbated the ‘unevenness’ of the above-
mentioned field of power of economics.  
                                                           
43
 Some of the named journals have terminated publication since, none of the journals made it 
into the Handelsblatt ranking list which is becoming an ever more crucial instrument in the 
measurement of research output, the allocation of funds and the recruitment process at German 
universities.   
44
 The Verein für Socialpolitik is historically the (inofficial) professional organisation of academic 
economists of the German speaking world.  
45
 Out of ten members of the SVR which the Trade Unions had a right to nominate since its 
establishment in 1967, only two came from the ranks of ‚heterodox economists‘ while the other 
eight nominees can almost entirely be categorized as ‘mainstream’ of ‘neo-Keynesian’ 
orientation. The fact that even Trade Unions referred to mainstream rather than heterodox 
economists may on the one hand be taken as evidence for the degree of non-acceptance within 
the academic community: although Trade Unions had a nomination right, the other (mainstream) 
members of the SVR had a right to reject nominees – heterodox nominees were always 
endangered to be rejected. On the other hand, from an economic policy perspective, neo-
Keynesians were seen as cricital enough to oppose the free market orientation of the majority of 
the SVR.            
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5. Conclusion 
 
The development of a scientific discipline is dependent on many determinants. 
As in every creative process, idiosyncratic factors within the personality of the 
individual scholar are especially important when it comes to explaining specific 
innovations or insights. A vital role is also played, of course, by the circumstances 
at the time, the economic or social developments that affect the research pro-
cess – this may take the form of an especially urgent problem that requires 
scholarly examination. But empirical anomalies, as we have known since Thomas 
S. Kuhn, have also frequently changed the direction and paradigmatic orientation 
of a science. Furthermore, distinctive features of a discipline must also be taken 
into account, e.g. the stage of development already reached, or the object of 
study itself. An immature, pre-paradigmatic science seems more open to new 
epistemic processes or methodological approaches than a more mature science 
in a paradigmatic state.  
 
Furthermore, the manner in which a society tends and protects its underlying 
institutions (e.g. the market) has an effect on the acceptance of theoretical and 
paradigmatic approaches – quite irrespective of their actual explanatory power 
(cf. Fourcade 2009: 35ff.). The sum of these factors describes what Imre Lakatos 
described as the ‘scientific battlefield.’ Depending on the specific circumstances 
of the time, idiosyncratic influencing factors, and the specifics of the discipline, 
this battlefield may be characterized by particularly intense interpretive struggles 
between different research programs (Lakatos), or may find itself in the calm 
waters surrounding a dominant hegemon, described by Kuhn as a ‘normal sci-
ence.’ And, lastly, there is one further determinant of the development of a sci-
entific discipline: the dispositions in the field of the science in question, which 
must be understood in Bourdieuian terms as a ‘field of power,’ in which the vari-
ous types of capital possessed determine the conditions in which the contest on 
the ‘battlefield’ is fought. 
 
This explanatory background helps to understand the development of economics 
at the beginning of the 20th century: The microeconomics-based equilibrium and 
welfare theory which was taking shape at the time co-existed with classically 
Marxist approaches and with the still-dominant ‘Historical School.’ The rise of 
Keynesianism to (worldwide) prominence in the early post-war period to around 
the mid-20th century cannot be explained without the global economic crisis of 
the 1930s, and the special position of John Maynard Keynes as an economist at 
one of the world’s most prestigious universities, a statesman, and the editor of 
what was at the time the most influential economics journal in the still relatively 
small community of economists. But equally, the specific interpretation of 
Keynesian macroeconomics as an outlier of neoclassical equilibrium theory, 
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which had a major influence on the professionalization and paradigmatic devel-
opment of economics, especially in Germany, cannot be explained without the 
increasing hegemony of American scholarship after the Second World War, and 
the position of Paul Samuelson at an elite US university, as well as the massive 
worldwide success of his textbook, Economics (cf. Skousen 1997; Davidson 2015). 
Economics had thus developed from a pre-paradigmatic, plural and evaluative 
science (‘advocacy’) to a mono-paradigmatic and positivist one (‘objectivity’). 
The co-opting of Keynes by general equilibrium theory satisfied the cultural re-
quirements of a science whose hegemon could not have legitimated any really 
fundamental criticism of the underlying institutions of its society. It was, howev-
er, this very domestication of the Keynesian paradigm, and the increasing theo-
retical criticism of its equilibrium-centered heuristics, that determined the de-
velopment of economics in the middle of the 20th century. The ‘battle of the par-
adigms’ was influenced by the simultaneous expansion and reform of the univer-
sities, a broad social liberation movement, which also affected the universities, 
and dispositions in the field of power in the economic discipline. 
 
The result was, at the beginning of the 1970s, a paradigmatic opening up of eco-
nomics in Germany, which took an extremely uneven course. While the tradi-
tional old universities only appointed heterodox economists by chance, two bas-
tions of heterodox economics emerged at the University of Bremen and the 
Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Politik (HWP) in Hamburg. In addition to these, a 
few newly founded universities – especially the ‘comprehensive universities’ in 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse – and a few existing universities, in which 
reform-oriented status groups were particularly active, allowed at least some 
steps to be taken towards a pluralization of economics. However, at no point 
were more than 10 percent of economics professorships filled by heterodox 
economists. Although heterodox economics quickly developed its own institu-
tions and networks, by founding organizations and journals, the following 40 
years saw an overall marginalization of heterodoxy in Germany. This was also 
reflected in the overlooking of heterodox economists during the restaffing of 
East German economics departments after the unification of Germany. The fol-
lowing factors must be taken into account here: 
 
1. The number of heterodox research programs represented in German universi-
ties, especially in the 1980s, does not suggest that heterodoxy became quantita-
tively insignificant because its approaches were beaten on the ‘battlefield of the 
paradigms.’ Moreover, empirical anomalies – such as the increasingly permanent 
presence of unemployment despite increasing flexibilization of the labor markets 
(cf. Heise/Kromphardt/Priewe 1998) – remained significant enough to encourage 
the continuing search for alternative explanations (within, but also outside the 
mainstream).  
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2. German economics surrendered completely to the hegemony of American 
economics after the Second World War. On the one hand, this was intended to 
offset actual deficits caused by the exodus of important scholars and the coun-
try’s isolation during the Nazi period. On the other hand, German economics 
could not escape the hegemonic claims to standardization asserted by certain 
elite US universities and their journals. Even today, this ‘(self-) Americanization’ 
lingers on under the catchphrase ‘international competitiveness,’ which is 
thought to preclude specific national paths (Sonderwege) – or national scientific 
cultures. Under these conditions, the marginalization of heterodox economics in 
the US had to be seen as, at least, a limiting parameter for developments in 
Germany.  
  
3. Heterodoxy and the mainstream coexisted, without any acknowledgement of 
heterodoxy by the mainstream or any extensive penetration of the mainstream 
by heterodoxy. This non-acknowledgement is manifested in the long-standing 
refusal to admit pluralistic reform universities to the DFG, the ongoing denial of 
decision-making positions in DFG committees to heterodox economists, the gen-
eral impossibility of accessing financial resources from the DFG, and the severely 
restricted access to publishing opportunities in journals which promise a high 
level of recognition, and which are supposedly not affiliated to any school. This 
denial of recognition became a standardized, institutionalized part of the alloca-
tion of university resources during the transition of university governance from 
committee-led to competitive universities, thus making this marginalization vir-
tually automatic, and above all, legitimizing it. The failure of heterodoxy to pene-
trate the mainstream is shown in the refusal of many heterodox economists to 
accept organizations such as the Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS) as representatives 
of the economics community with no paradigmatic affiliations. It should be men-
tioned, though, that the distribution of the heterodox VfS members over the 
committees of the VfS (the vast majority are members of the committee on the 
history of dogma) suggests that the specific rite of admission to the VfS imposed 
clear restrictions on access to the core areas of the VfS and was therefore also an 
instrument for denying recognition. 
 
4. The reproduction of heterodox economists remained well below the average. 
The reason for this was the below-average number of positions available for jun-
ior researchers (Qualifikationsstellen), and the severe restrictions on access to 
DFG resources. But the orientation of many heterodox economists, who pre-
ferred to have an influence on society (through research transfer) than on the 
academic community (through research), is also likely to have played a part. The 
recruitment process in the economics faculties of East German universities after 
the German unification makes it clear, however, that it is not only the below-
average reproduction of heterodoxy – i.e. a problem of supply –, but also the 
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very much below-average level of recruitment – i.e. a problem of demand – that 
have to be taken into account as important factors. 
 
5. Due to the special significance of the University of Bremen and the HWP for 
the development of heterodoxy, their specific circumstances have to be exam-
ined. These show the same thing that has happened, so far, to all attempts to 
influence traditional economics with a new orientation: in the end, the denial of 
recognition by the academic community led to a loss of political-social support 
and, ultimately, to the dissolution or at least total marginalization of the hetero-
dox academic unit.  
 
The representatives of heterodox economics did not succeed in establishing 
pluralization as part of the ‘cultural capital’ of the German community of econo-
mists, and were thus unable to claim recognition for the heuristic divergence of 
their own paradigmatic approach in relation to the mainstream focus on self-
regulation. Their chances of winning the ‘battle of the paradigms’ were hopeless, 
given their vast inferiority in terms of every kind of capital: economic (professor-
ships and the associated positions for junior researchers, access to financial re-
sources from the DFG etc.), social (networks based on VfS membership, editorial 
boards of journals, influential scholarly organizations such as scientific advisory 
committees of federal ministries, boards of reviewers of the DFG etc.) and sym-
bolic (presidents of important economic research institutes, members of scien-
tific advisory boards in federal ministries, members of the SVR (German Council 
of Economic Experts), etc.). Nor were they able to prevent the establishment of 
scientific standards which systematically belittled the value of heterodox eco-
nomics, thus perpetuating the marginalization of heterodoxy and ensuring the 
monistic idealization of the mainstream. In short, the setting of paradigmatic 
standards has been used to close the academic system, after previous attempts 
to close it by means of socio-structural attributions had failed due to the sudden 
expansion of the universities in the early 1970s. 
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